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"LIMITED AVAILABILITY FOR SHIFT EMPLOYMENT
A CRITERION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION"*
By

RALPH ALTMAN** AND VIRGINIA LEWIS***

THE PROBLEM

A

1942

DECISION

of the Virginia Unemployment Compensation

Commission dealt with the claim of a woman worker who
refused an offer of rotating shift work about 12 miles from her
home. She had formerly been employed at rotating shift work but
now, because of the necessary care of her month-old infant and her
other children, she could no longer accept any niglit work. The
Commissioner said. "In my opinion night shift work for a mother
with an infant child, who is unable to arrange for the proper
care of the child during her absence from home, would not be
suitable work." Despite this finding the Commissioner concluded
that the claimant was unavailable for work and therefore ineligible
for unemployment benefits. She had, he said, removed herself, from
the current available labor market because she could no longer
accept her usual type of job.'
In Vermont an unemployment compensation referee, in 1942,
made a similar ruling in the case of an unemployed woman worker
who could not accept tlurd-shift work at night, because she had
no one to care for her 19-month-old baby during those hours.
She-was willing and able to accept work on the other two shifts
but there were no openings for her. There was no other industry
employing women in the area where she lived in which she would
be qualified for employment. 2
*This article was also published in (1944) 22 North Carolina Law
Review 189.
**LL.B., 1939, Albany Law School, Albany, N. Y. Member New
York Bar.
***LL.B., 1941, George Vashington University Law School, Washington, D. C. Member Tennessee Bar.
Both authors are Social Science Analysts, Bureau of Employment
Security, Social Security Board, Washington, D. C. The opinions expressed
in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily thc views of the
Social Security Board.
'Unemployment Coipensation Interpretation Service, 7892-Va. R.,
Benefit Series, Vol. 6, No. 4.
2U. C. I. S., 7711-Vt. A, Ben. Ser., Vol. 5, No. 12.
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A 1943 decision of a Kansas Labor Department Appeals
Referee concerned a claimant who had quit her job when she
was transferred from the night shift to day work. At the time
there were no day nurseries in her community and she could
find no one to care for her two small children. Subsequently
day nurseries in the community were equipped to answer her
needs and she was ready to accept work onl any shift. The referee
held that she was unavailable for work and ineligible for unemployment benefits during the time she was unable to accept da
work. He said "To be available for full-time commercial employment one must be ready, willing and able to accept work on
any of the regular shifts."'
Since the war began unemployment compensation has been
faced with this bedrock question-limted availability Every
State unemployment compensation law contains, in one form or
another, the requirement that claimants must be "available for
work" in order to receive benefits. But what is "availability" Is
it complete and absolute readiness, willingness and ability to
accept any and every job-total availability' Or is it something
less ' How much less ' State unemployment compensation agencies
have, ever since they started paying benefits, been required to
answer these questions. The war, however, has phrased these
questions for the State agencies in their most acute form. "Limited
availability" cases involve instances where the employability of
claimants is restricted as to the time, place, kind or other conditions of the work they are willing or able to accept. Limited availability questions have otten arisen in wartime in the form of
"shift employment" cases. These are cases where workers have
either refused to accept night work or have designated certain
work shifts as unacceptable to them. As might be expected. most
ot the workers who have so limited their employability have been
women, usually the mothers of young children. Beset by emplover
pressures on the one hand and by social considerations on the
other unemployment compensation tribunals and admunistrators
have been forced to devote considerable time and thought to the
general problem of limited availability
It has been generally understood that "availability" is synonvmous with "attachment to the labor force" or as it is sometimes
said, "attachment to the labor market." This understanding, however has contributed little to specific interpretation of the term
"availability "
3U.

C. I. S., 8256-Kan. A, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 12.
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Although the unemployment compensation statutes generally
set forth a clear, positive requirement that a claimant must be
"available for work," an examination of the provisions of the
ordinary State unemployment compensation law shows that the
legislature could not have intended to require total availability
For example, all State unemployment compensation laws disqualify
claimants who refuse offers of work. The great majority of State
laws, however, provide that, before a claimant can be disqualified
for a work.refusal, it must be shown that the work was suitable
for him and that he had no good cause for refusing. The unemployment compensation laws ordinarily direct that in determining
whether or not any work is suitable for an individual the State
unemployment agency shall consider the degree of risk involved
to the individual's health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness
and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of
,unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the offered work from lis
residence. Furthermore, in compliance with section 1603 (a)(5)
of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, all State unemplovment compensation laws provide that benefits shall not be dened
to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new
work4 under any of the following conditions (a) if the position
offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor
dispute, (b) if the remuneration, hours, or other conditions of
the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (c) if as
a condition of being employed the individual would be required to
join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining
any bona fide labor organization.
Thus, it seems obvious that availability for work must mean
availability for suitable work.5 It follows that claimants are free
to impose some restrictions upon their employability without impairing their "availability" for work.
4-As a matter of fact most State Employment Compensation Laws go
beyond the Federal requirement and say that "no work shall be deemed
suitable and benefits shall not be denied" to any otherwise eligible worker
for refusing to accept new work which violates these standards.
:Stella v. Downyflake Restaurant, 126 Conn. 441, 11 \. (2d) 848
(1940), U. C. I. S., Benefit Series. 7189-Ala. A, Vol. 5, No. 4 ; 6686-Calif.
R, Vol. 4, No. 12; 7705-Calif. A, Vol. 5, No. 12, 7778-Del. R, Vol. 6. No.
2, 1467-Ind. A, Vol. 2, No. 5, 3575-Me. A, Vol. 3, No. 6; 6403-N. Y. A,
Vol.-4, No. .9; 704-N. C. A, Vol. 1, No. 8, 6963-N. C. A, Vol. 5. No. 2;
3589-N. Dak. A, Vol. 3, No. 6; 4520-Okla. A, Vol. 3, No. 10; 2692-Ore.
A, Vol. 3, No. 2; 6793-Wash. A, Vol. 4, No. 12; 6248-Ind. Ct. D., Vol.
4, No. 8.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIATIONS

IN STATE LAWS

Although the standard provision as to availability in State
unemployment compensation laws is that a worker must be "able
to work and available for work," a substantial minority of the
States vary from this pattern. Fourteen of the 51 jurisdictions
require more than merely "available for work." These States are
Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Miss6uri, Montana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington,
West Virginia. Wisconsin.
Summarizing these exceptional laws we find that three of
them require that the claimant be "seeking work"-Minnesota.
Missouri, and Washington. Three require the claimant to be "unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or in any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted and tramed"-Massachusetts,
New York. and Ohio. Other exceptional concepts deal more directly with the question of limited availability While Kentucky
requires that a claimant be available for "suitable work." \\ashington demands availability for "an, suitable work" (emphasis
ours.) Michigan and West Virginia deal with one aspect of limitations upon employability and require that the individual be available for "full-time work." Rhode Island reqires availability for
work "whenever duly called for work through the employment
office." Alabama and Michigan deal with the matter of locality
and require that a claimant be available for work either in a place
where he earned some of his base l)eriod wage credits or in a
place where it may reasonably be expected (or the conuission

finds) that there is available work of the kind for which the
claimant nimist hold himself available. The kind of work the Miclugan or Alabama claimant is required to take is better uiderstood
by examining the favored type of availability clause among these
exceptional 14 States. In addition to Alabama and Michigan there
are four other States, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, and West Virginia,
which in one way or another require availability for work for
(Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1940) tit. 26, §213(C) , Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1942)

§341.350(3),

(4),

Me. Pub. Laws, 1935, c. 192 as amended

Mass.

Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 151A, § 24(b) , Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson. 1936) §17.530(C) , Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §4337-26(c),
Mo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1940) p. 4770, §13194-9(c) , Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
(Darlington, Supp. 1939) §3303.7(c) , New York Unemployment Insurance
Law §§502(10) 503(1) 506(2), Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937)
§1345-6(1) , R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) C. 284, §7(2) , Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940) §9998-104(c) , W Va. Code Ann. (Miehie,
1937) §2366(75), Wis. Stat. (1941) §108.04(1)
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which the claimant "is fitted by prior traimng and experience.""
Michigan adds an entirely new element by requiring that the
claimant be available not only for "work of a character which he
is qualified to perform by past experience or training" but also
that he be available for "work of a character generally similar to
work for which he has previously received wages."
What effect do these atypical provisions as to availability have
upon cases involving a limitation by the worker upon the time of
day or shift in which he will work? Certainly it cannot be said
that "seeking work" has anything at all to do with our case.
Conceivably, a requirement that a claimant be unable to obtain
work in his usual occupation or a job which he is reasonably fitted
to take may have a bearing. For example, a worker to whom night
work is available but who refuses to accept anything but day
work may have difficulty in proving that he is unable to obtain
work in his usual occupation or one for which he is reasonably
fitted.s The applicability of the Washington requirement, that a
claimant must be available for "any suitable work," to a worker's
restrictions as to shift employment would seem to depend entirely
upon whether or not work on the excluded shift was suitable for
that worker The Kentucky requirement that the claimant must
be available for "suitable work" is nothing more than legislative
codification of the ordinary rule that obtains in other States. The
requirement, in Michigan and lWest Virginia, that the claimant
must be available for "full-time work" does nothing more than
has been achieved in other States by interpretation of the word
"work." The usual meaning given the phrase "full-time work"
has been in terms of a full work-week of 40 and sometimes 48
hours. Evidently this should have no relation to the question of
availability for work on particular shifts. Obviously, too. a re'The exact provisions vary. The requirement just znentioned is the Vest
Virginia wording. Alabama requires that a claimant be available for "work
of a character which he is qualified to perform by past ecxperience or train-

mng." Maine requires that he be "available for work at hIs usual or cus-

tomary trade, occupation, profession, or business as his prior experience

shows him to be fitted or qualified." The Minnesota requirement is that lie
must be "available for work in his usual trade or occupation or in any
other trade or occupation for which he demonstrates lie is reasonably fitted."
Ohio provides that he must be "available for work in his usual trade or
occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for which lie is reasonably

fitted!"SThe usual statutory criteria of suitable work may tend to take some

of the harshness out of this kind of law. Thus, in the case suggested, if
night work is unsafe for the worker's health, safety, or morals, for example,
such work might be omitted, as unsuitable work, from consideration as a

test of his availability.
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quirenient that the claimant be available for work in a particular
locality has no direct bearing on the matter of restriction of the
claimant's employability to certain times of day So also a requirement that the claimant be available for work for which he is
fitted by prior training or experience or even for work similar to
the work for which he has previously received wages apparently
has no immediate connection with any restriction that may exist
upon his employment on particular shifts. Despite the fact that
these latter provisions-as to localities where the claimant must
be available and as to the type of work for which he must be
available-have no immediate bearing upon restrictions as to
shift employment, nevertheless they do set a labor market pattern
for the claimant. These requirements create for each claiiiant
certain occupations for which he must be available or localities
where he must be able to work. By so doing they set an industrial pattern which will sometimes determine whether or not the
claimant s particular restriction as to the time of day in which
he will work will actually take him out of the labor force.
None of these non-standard availability provisions can be
said to require "total availability" in the sense of complete availability for any work during any and all hours. The most stringent
prowision-the Washington provision-requires availability for
"any stutable work." Obviously that is something less than "any
work" or "all work." "Full-time work," the Michigan-West Virginia requirement, certainly does not mean 24-hours-a-day. neither
does it necessarily mean work at all times during the 24-hour
period. No American unemployment compensation statute has
such a specific requirement. In fact, no American unemployment
compensation law specifies the time of day when a claimant must
be available for work.
AVARTIME

RISE OF TlE PROBLEM

\Ve have said that the war has made the meaning of the
availability provisions an acute question. Shift employment, relatively infrequent before the defense program, has assumed considerable proportions during the war Some workers have refused
to accept this change many because of health or domestic circunistances, are in no position to do so. Thus we find that soie
unemlplovment compensation claimants limit tlieir emiployability to
particular work shifts, usually the more favorable or (lay shifts.
It is understandable that in wartime there should lie a marked
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tendency to refuse to consider as eligible for benefits those workers
who will not accept otherwise suitable work that is offered them
during night hours. The pressure of public opinion, which finds
-it -difficult to understand why employment benefits should be paid
to an unemployed worker whose skill can be used at a time of
day when he cannot or will not work, has strengthened this
tendency. Often too, the fact that the unfavorable work shift was
the only shift open to a worker in a particular establishment or In
a particular industry-as the result of a custom of the industry, a
rule of the employer, or a union contract-has persuaded the uiemployment compensation agency to rule that the claimant who
will not or cannot work on that shift has cut himself off from the
market for his services.
Largely because of these considerations, there has been, in
recent months, a wave of restrictive rulings in this field. In order
to receive benefits, more and more unemployed workers have
been required to hold themselves available for work at all hours
of the day. There are important social as well as legal aspects
to this limited availability problem. 1-low much should the workers'
freedom of choice be limited" Most administrative appealed decisions covering shift employment have dealt with the claim., of
married women who, because of the need to care for their childrei,
specified particular shifts as the only time they could work. "ro
say that these individuals cut themselves off from the active labor
force is particularly unfair, since they, by the withholding of
benefits, are under pressure to make the socially unwise choice
of accepting work at.such hours that they must neglect their
children. These social issues. as well as the legal questions. are
raised by the decisions set out below
Jtdson Mills v The S. C. Unemplownent Compensation Cantinission and Spears." Spears. an unemployed cotton mill hand.
limited his employability to the first shift. He could not work on
the second shift because lie had to look after his children while
his wife worked he could not work on the third shift because of
his health. The claims examiner disqualified the claimant for a
refusal of suitable work. On appeal to the \ppeals Referee the
determination was reversed. but Spears was held unavailable for
work. Spears appealed to the Commission. which reversed the
decision of the Appeals Referee and adopted the determmnatmon
9Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County. S. C. (Dec. 9, 1942),
C.C.H. S. C. Par. 8118, U. C. I. S., 7944-S. C. Ct. D, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6,
No. 5.
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of the clains examiner The employer then appealed to the Court
of Common Pleas which reversed the Commission's decision and
held that the claimant was not available for work.
The court in its opinion, seemed to recognize properly the
general princple involved, that the question of availability for
work is essentially one of degree. It did not base its holling on
this general princi)le, for it went on to state that refusal to accept
suitable work per se results in unavailability This statement seems
inconsistent with a recognition of the question of availability as
one of degree. The court also said
"To be able and available for work a claimant must be able
and available for a majority of the average number of
hours normally and customarily worked in his occupation each (lay with a further condition that there ntst be a
minimum of eight hours per day within which the claimant
could accept work if it be offered."
It thus appears that the court itself was unable to state clearly the
main characteristics of availability which are essential to a claillant's eligibility for benefits.
In attempts to determine the legal content of the availability
requirement. it has usually been held that if a claimant is ready
and willing to work and if his personal circumstances are such
that he can accept work, he has fulfilled this requiretent 1'
Furthermore, the "work" which the claimant must he willing to
accept is usually deemed to be suitable work. t With these concepts in mnld let us examine further the court's opinion in the
Judson Mills Case.
If we assume that the claimant in the instant case was actually
willing to work, we must determine whether or not his personal
circumstances rendered unsuitable work during the hours which
he excluded. The claimant was unable to accept third-shift work
because he had been told by his physicians to discontinue night
work which was injurious to his eyes. It would seem, therefore,
that under section 7035-82(7035-85)(c)(1)' of the South Carolina law which provides in part that "in determining whether or
not any work is suitable for an individual, the commission shall
" work oil
consider the degree of risk involved to his health,
within the
work
the third shift for this claimant was not suitable
meaning of the statute. (Underscoring provided.)
loSocial Security Yearbook (Social Security Board, 1940) 35.
lSee note 5, supra.
12S. C. Code Ann. (1942) §7035-84(c)
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Spears could not accept second shift work because he had
to care for his children during those hours. The language of the
South Carolina law readily lends itself to tvo interpretations other
than the one the court apparently adopted. (1) The provisions of
section 7035-82(7035-85)(c)(1)13 (quoted above) should not be
regarded as limiting the elements of suitability which the Coinmission may corlsider to those which the section specifies. So
treated, the Commission, after considering the factors enumerated
in (c) (1), would be free to take into account any other factors
affecting the suitability of the work in question. It would be
possible, therefore, for the Commission to decide that the claimant's personal circumstances were such as to render work on the
second shift unsuitable for him. (2) Since there is nothing in the
language of section 7035-82(7035-85) (c) (1)1 4 which covers the
claimant's reason for his unwillingness to accept such work, it may
be copsidered that second-shift work is suitable for the claimant.
The necessity that the claimant be at home to look after the children, however, constitutes "good cause" for his refusal of the
work., Thus, no disqualification for his refusal of suitable work
would be in order.
A finding that' the claimant was available for work is not mcon. sistent with either of these views. If the first view is the one
adopted, the work would be unsuitable and as such would not
affecf the claimant's availability, since the general requirement
is that a claimant need be available for suitable work only. On the
other hand, if the second view is accepted, "availability" need be
consonant only with such suitable work for which i1o good cause
for -refusal' exists.
Even if the approach is taken that availability for suitable work
is required, regardless of the sufficiency of the claimant's cause for
refusing, it does not follow that Spears was unavailable for work.
Let us accept the court's unspoken premise that second-shift work
was suitable for Spears. Does it follow, merely from the fact
that he would accept work on only one of the two shifts available
for him, that he was detached from the active labor force? Conclusions as to attachment to the labor force can hardly be based
solely on statutory construction. They depend upon economic
facts, facts as to the claimant's skills, training and experience,
facts as to the work for which the claimant is accessible, facts
as to the industrial practices in the claimant's labor market area.
13Ibid.
'qbid.
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The court, however undertook no such discussion of the problen. A worker, according to the court, "must be truly and actually
able and available to accept any suitable work which may be
offered to him. If his availability is materially limited or restricted
it cannot then be said that he is in fact in the labor market or that
actually he is out of work because no work can be had by him.

There is no reason to examine the causes occasioning the claimant's inability to work on the second and third shifts." It appears
that the court not only disregarded the concept of "good cause" but
it did not even discuss the suitability of the work for the claimant.
Thus, on an assumption of suitability it was found that the
claimant imposed such an undue restriction on his availability for
work as was tantamount to a withdrawal from the labor force.
Insotar as shift employment is concerned, this case holds that
a claimant must be able and available for a majority of the average
number of hours customarily worked each day in the industry
Judson Mills v S C Unemployment Compensation Comninssion and Gaines."' Mrs. Gaines was employed on the third sh ft. A
relative had looked after her children while she worked. The relative left and Mrs. Gaines, unable to secure anyone to care for her
children, left her work to remain at home. She was offered work on
the third shift on several occasions but refused on the ground that
she was available for work only on the first or second shifts. A
deputy's holding that she was unavailable for work was affirmed
by the Appeals Referee. The claimant appealed to the Commission
which reversed the Appeals Referee and held that she had left her
work voluntarily with good cause and was available for work, since
she was able and available for work on the first and second shifts.
Employer then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which
reversed the Commission and held the claimant unavailable for
work.
The court's conclusion was "that in order to be entitled to
benefits under the Act the unemployed individual must be able
to and available for the work which he or she has been doing,"
on the shift that she has worked. The court's only support for this
conclusion was an Ohio case, Brown-Brocknever Company v
Board of Reviez 16
'.5 Court of Common Pleas. Greenville County, S. C. (August 10, 1943),
aff'd, 28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944)
1670 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 152 (1942) U. C. I. S., 7912-Ohio
Ct. D., Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 4. Under the facts of the Ohio case it would
appear to be questionable whether the claimant was physically able to work.
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An interpretation of the term "work," in the statutory phrase
"available for work," to mean the individual's last job seems without support in the Soath Carolina unemployment compensation
law (or in any American unemployment compensation law"v).
In the disqualification provisions for voluntary leaving' s and
misconduct the term "most recent work" is used. Thus, if it
were intended by the legislature that availability should be confined to an individual's last employment, the legislature could have
specifically imposed* such a limitation.
Under the court's decision if a claimant were dismissed from
a job under circumstances which would make the job unsuitable
for him, such claimant would be ineligible for benefits if he were
not available for this.last job. Section 7035-82(c)(1)20 provides
in part that:
"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an
individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk
involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical
fitness and prior training."
In the light of this provision it is quite possible that an individual's
last job would not constitute "suitable work." The legislature
could hardly have intended the anomalous result of the court's
ruling that an individual should be ineligible for benefits if he
were not available for such unsuitable work. Provisions enacted
by the legislature protect such individual from pressure to accept
work if it is injurious in the respects specified. It appears that
the legislative intent as expressed in the disqualification provisions
and in the availability provision is reconcilable only on the theory
that a claimant's availability is not dependent on his willingness to
engage in his last employment.
I
The second question presented by the court's decision is
whether a claimant who is available for work on two out of three
shifts is available for work within the meaning of section 7035-84
(c).-' The two shifts for which the claimant was available included the hours from seven or eight in the morning until eleven
or twelve at night, thus including more than the normal 3korkmg
hours of the publicas a whole. On the basis of the view expressed
in Judson Mills v. S. C. Unemployinent Compensation Coinits-7See discussion under Significance of Variations in State Laws, supra.
18S. C. Code Ann. (1942) §7035-85(a).
19S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 7035-85(b).
20

See note 12, supra.

-lIbid.
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stor and Spears22 discussed above, tile clanuant il the instant
case would have been held available for work, since she was available "for a majority of the average number of hours normally
and customarily worked in his [her] occupation each day " The
court in the first Judson Mills Case stated further
"It should not be required, however, that tile actual hours
of the day in which tile clainant could accept work be the
identically same hours in which he was last employed unless
he be available for no other kind of work and the hours in
vhich he is available are not included in the work (lay of his
industry "
Mrs. Gaines obviously met tile additional standard suggested in
the first Judson Mills Case.
The court in the second Judson Mills Case was influenced by
the theory that the experience rating provisions control the definition of involuntary unemploynent.23 In accordance with this
theory the court considered the claimant's right to benefits in terms
of employer responsibility for her unemployment. Since it was
obvious that her employer was not the proximate cause of her
unemployment, the court concluded that her unemployment wls

not involuntary in nature. The legislature in establishing experience rating expressly provides that "nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit benefits payable pursuant to Section
1035-83.-24 It should be noted that even if an employer were to
achieve complete employnent stabilization, his tax rate would be .9
per cent of his pay roll. This fact indicates that the employer's
fault in not attaining employment stabilization is not the sole basis

for the imposition of the tax. Hence, the testing of the clainant's
benefit rights in these terms has the effect of adding a new eligibility requirement. It might also be noted that there seems little
or no relation between employer responsibility and the criteria
set forth in section 7035-82(c) (1)25 as measuring-sticks of the
22See note 9, supra.
It is interesting to note that the court in the Gaines Case said that
it was the first case in which it was necessary to determine the content of
the term "availability." The same court (with'a different judge sitting)
had said approximately the same thing when the decision was rendercd in
the Spears Case on December 9, 1942, only eight months before the decision
in the
Gaines Case.
23
"Experience rating" is a device for unemployment compensation tax
computation for employers upon the basis of their experience with respect
to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct relation to unepl oyment risk.
24S.

25

C. Code Ann. (1942) §703 5-87(c)(1)

See note 12, supra.
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suitability of offered work

degree of risk involved to health,

safety and morals, physical fitness, prior training, etc.
It appears that the court's theory is fundamentally unsound
in that it does not. recognize that the underlying purpose of the
South Carolina unemployment compensation law is to furnish
compensation for those who are unemployed through no fault of
their own. It does not follow that stabilization of employment is
not an inportant subsidiary of the program. But it should be recognized that in a program of unemployment compensation the primary motive is to provide benefits, not to reduce tax rates. The
concept of availability for work should have no relation to the
presence of experience rating provisions. In fact, most state tinemployment compensation laws, as originally enacted, contained
tleir present availability provisions and contained no experience
rating.
With respect to shift employment this case stands for the
proposition that a claimant, in order to meet the eligibility requirements of the South Carolina law, must be available not only
for the work which she has been doing, but also for the shift
on which she has been working.
20

DINOVELLIS V. DANTAIER, ADMINISTRATOR

Claimant refused to accept work on any but the day shift because she had someone to take care of her children during the
day but she felt that she should be at home to supervise them in
the evening. Although she made iidependent efforts to find work,
she refused to acept a referral to a job on a swing shift. The
agency denied benefits on the ground that she had placed such
restrictions on her availability as to render her unavailable for
work. The commissioner, however, found her available for work
on the ground that she was ready willing, and able to work. The
court held that the claimant refused to accept employment for
personal reasons not connected with the suitability of the work
offered and, therefore. she was unavailable for work.
In the language of the court this case "presents the question
whether in order that an individual otherwise qualified to be paid
benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act, to enforce
his right to them, must be willing to accept employment at any
hours of the day or whether for reasons of personal convenience
6
2 Docket No. 69078, Superior Court, Hartford County, Conn. (June 25,
1943).
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he may refuse employment offered hin without forfeiting his
right to the benefit payments for which the Act provides, because the same does not fit into his personal circumstances even
though he be physically and mentally fit to perform it and it is
such as is reasonably adapted to his abilities and experience."
The court goes on to say that after an individual has been
tound initially eligible, there exists a duty " 'to apply for available.
suitable work when directed to (1o so by the public employnent
bureau or the administrator' and 'to accept suitable work when
offered him by the public employment bureau or by an eiiployer'
" Moreover, the court says, the conditions relevant
to suitability of work as detailed in section 1339(e) (b) (1) all
relate to conditions of employment or econonic factors. This is
correct and the court further states correctly that none of these
conditions describes an offered job as unsuitable because of the
hours during which the work is to be performed. Section 1339
(e)(b)(1) provides in part
"In determining whether or not any work or self-employment is suitable for an individual, the administrator mna,
consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety
and morals, his physical fitness and prior training and experience, his length of employment, his prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation and the distance of the available work from his residence." (Emphasis
ours.)

Thus. by the terms of this provison, certain factors are enumerated which may be considered in reaching a determination
as to the suitability of a particular job. The administrator however is not limited to a consideration of these factors alone in
reaching his determnation and. therefore, he is free to consider
any additional factors wIch he deems relevant to the issue of
suitability
iMoreover the legislature in enacting section 1339(e) (h) (I
c!earlv authorizes a consideration of factors personal to the clannant-i.e.. the degree of risk involved to his health, his plhysical
fitness. etc. Here is a plain statement that conditions which are
personal to the claimant and beyond the control of the employer
may be decisive in ascertaining the claimant's right to benefits.
The court, therefore, as noted above, was correct in stating that
section 1339(e) (b) (I) described conditions relating to conditions
of employment or economic factors. The court, however did not
go far enough. Some of these conditions ot employment are to
be considered in terms of factors personal to the claimant. Ac-
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cordingly, a factory might have the best lighting equipment available for night work and yet night work under those circumstances might well be injurious to a particular worker. Such conditions of employment, the best developed by modern science,
although suitable for thousands of other individuals, would be
insufficient to render the work suitable for a specified claimant.
It is inevitable (as well as desirable), under the Connecticut
statute, that personal factors should be considered in determining
the suitability of work.
The closing paragraphs of the court's opinion are interesting
because the influence of the experience rating provisions is clearly
indicated.
"However that may be, the fact cannot be overlooked that
the legislation is social in character and the attainment of
its objectives is made possible only by the imposition of a
tax upon the pay rolls of all employers within its field .of
operation, wich becomes a cost of operation of every business, enterprise or industry so affected. No question is
raised as concerns the validity of the Act as a valid exercise of the police power, but if the monies so raised by! such
taxation were to be made expendable to persons out of employment who might refuse to accept employment for no
cause related to the reasonable suitability of it, but for other
reasons wholly personal or appertaining only to their convemence, it would be obvious that the proceeds of such
taxation would be spent to the extent that they were permitted, for purposes having no attachment to unemployment resulting from economic forces or related to any
legitimate public concern. Legislation of that character
would certainly be of very doubtful validity. - (Footnote
supplied.)
"The conclusion is that the plaintiff is not 'available for
work' within the meaning of the Act."
The Connecticut statute, unlike the one in South Carolina,
contains no provision that nothing in the section establishing
experience rating shall be construed to limit the payment of benefits. It would seem. however, that even in the absence of such
a provision, the propriety of denying benefits because the payment of benefits might increase the employer's cost of operation
is questionable. Benefits should be granted or denied according
to the merits of each case and without consideration of the effect
of such grant or denial on the employer's experience rating.
27
Compare the language of the Georgia Board of Review, infra. See
note 31, post.
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According to the court, a claimant in order to be available for
work must be willing to accept any suitable employment at any
time on any shift. There is no discussion by the court as to
whether or not the claimant had "good cause" for refusing the
offered work.
CARANI

v

DANAHER,

ADMINISTRATOR

28

This decision represents an interesting and heartening deviation from the rule of the Dinovellis decision.
Mrs. Carani was a 40-year-old married woman and the mother
of seven children, ranging in age from 6 to 19 In her last employment she had worked on the 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift. Upon the
advice of her doctor, she quit the job because it was too heavy
for her She was disqualified not because of any unjustified refusal of suitable work but because a routine examination revealed
that she was unwilling to accept work other than on the second
shift. She put this restriction upon her availability because she
wished to take care of her children and prepare their meals during the earlier hours of the day As a result of her independent
effort to obtain second shift work, she was able, on June 4, 1943,
to obtain a satisfactory job with an airplane company ';he was
unenployed from March until June 1943.
The court s opinion points out that previous Connecticut decslons, "9 both judicial and administrative, have held that a claimant who was available for part-time work only and for work
which was sinilar to that in which he had earned his wage credits
was available for work. The court noted that British decisions
also allowed claimants to select the hours of employment so long
as there was a market for that kind of work. The court reached the
conclusion that the appellant was "ready eager and anxious to
accept employment there is a market on the shift selected by her,
and thus she is available for work in the same type of employment in which she earned her wage credits." Therefore, said the
court, the claimant was available for work.
,\ note of caution should be sounded concerning this decision.
Because the court mentioned the claimant's availability for the
2SDocket No. 69595, Superior Court, Hartford County, Conn. (Oct.
18, 1943), U. C. I. S., 8416-Conn. Ct. D., Ben. Ser., Vol. 7, No. 3.
2"Egan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co,. Docket No. 59738, Superior
Court. Hartford County. Conn. (March 15, 1939), Keller v. Brown-Thoiison. Inc., Docket No. 59737 Superior Ct.. Hartford County, Conn. (March
16, 1939), U. C. 866-A-41, U. C. 50-A-43.
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kind of work in wich she had earned her wage credits, this decision might be taken to mean that a claimant who is available
for some other sluft than the one on which he had earned his
wage credits is not available for work. In this connection, it
should be noted that the entire first portion of the decision (where
there is reference to the claimant's availability for work similar
to that in which she had earned her wage credits) has been taken
almost bodily from the administrative decision rendered by the
Commissioner. The following statements in the court opinion
(apparently original with the court and not borrowed from the
administrative decision) show no concern with the relationship
between the work for which the claimant is now available and the
work she had previously done.
"This claimant, ordinarily, would not be required to
work. Realizing that she is required to try to earn money
in order to support and take care of her family, she is endeavoring to do what she thinks is her duty to her family.
She meets it in the way which is most consistent with her
desire to earn her living mad, at the same time, to comply
with her duty as a mother of these children. In addition
to this her occupation is such that it is of benefit to the \War
endeavor. Her difficulty arises out of her attempt to meet
all of these obligations in a way consistent with normal
effort. This seems to account for her desire to work on the
particular shift on which she has elected to work. Such attitude ought to be encouraged. The record does not show
that any inconvenience or harm comes to anyone by reason
of her election."
Furthennore, an inference that the court intended to suggest
that a claimant who is available for some shift other than the one on
which- he earned his wage credits is unavailable for work hardly
seems warranted in view of all the facts in the case. Before her
unemployment Mrs. Caram worked for the Hartford Machine
Screw Company, doing bench work. She was forced to quit after
she was transferred to machine operations. The work she ultimately
obtained, after her unemployment, was a job as an inspector with
the United Aircraft Corporation. These facts do not readily permit
the conclusion that Mrs. Caram was available for exactlv' the
same kind of work in which she earned her wage credits. Probably
it was, in a general way, similar work for which she was available
and it was on the same shift. Viewing the case as a whole and considering the authorities cited by the court, the most reasonable
conclusion would seem to be that the court intended to state nothing
more than this minimal rule. Where a claimant limits his avail-
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alility to work of the same general type and on the same shift in
which he earned his wage credits there can be no doubt of lus
availability particularly when there is a reasonable explanation
for the liintation. ks to other lintations-to other kinds of work
on other shifts-no inference should be drawn from the court's
words.
The opinion in this case represents a departure from the ruling
in the Dinovellis Case discussed above. Although the same court
(but wvith different judges sitting) decided both cases, there is no
reference to the Dinovellis Case in the Carani decision. The two
cases would appear to be irreconcilable, even after allowance has
been made for the fact that the claimant in the latter case had
actually demonstrated her availability by securing a job of the
type to which she had restricted herself. Under the rule of the
Dinovellis Case a claimant in order to be available for work mutist
be willing to accept any suitable employment at any tine onl any
shift.
SHIFT EMPLOYMENT

SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The mechanistic legal approach of the Judson Mills Cases and
the Dinoellis decision becomes all the nore striking when the
social aspects of the subject are considered. The decisions we have
discussed are typical. Their facts have been repeated over and over
in hundreds of adininstrative decisions concerning restrictions
upon shirt employment. Usually the claimants are women, usually
they have young children usually they cannot accept night work.
These clainants and the clainants in the cases we have discussed
are of inportance to their State and their nation not only as votential workers but as parents and citizens as well. These decisions
leave real doubt as to whether the litigants' briefs presented this
"social" side of the picture to the courts.
Recently the NVomen's Bureau of United States Department of
Labor made a survey of 137 plants in New Jersey devoting 50
per cent or more of their production to war contract work. Oi
the Inatter of shift employment the Bureau reported'-"
"In general, women who have worked onl either the evening
or the graveyard shift do not like it. The most frequent
reason given concerns irregularity in sleeping and eating,
resulting in fatigue and sleepiness during working hours on
the one hand, and indigestion and loss of weight on the
30
Women Workers In Some Expanding Wartime Industries, New Jersey, 1942, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 197, pages 18 and 19.
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other. Young people complain that the evening shift interferes with recreation and social life. Married women object
to being away from their families in the late afternoon and
evemng, and many perform their household tasks during
the day and are tired when worktine comes. Of those who
reported that they liked night work, the chief reason given
was the fact that they had the daytime hours free in which
to take care of their children and do their housework. Not
infrequently their husbands were on the day shift and took
over the children's care when the women left for work.
Some women prefer the ight shift because the noise and
confusion are considerably reduced, and a few like it because it is cooler.
"Married women, especially those with children, were somewhat more numerous than single women among those who
preferred to work in the evening, that is, on the second shift.
Thirty per cent of the 696 women workers interviewed had
children. Most of these mothers had more than one child,
and in four-fifths of the cases at least one of the children
was under 14 years old. A substantial proportion of the
mothers had children under 6. Children in the younger
groups require constant adult supervision and care. Those
who are attending school should be in a responsible person's
charge before and after school hours, yet of 167 mothers
with children under 14 years, as many as 38, well over onefifth, left their children to their own devices while at work.
The children simply took care of themselves. More than
half the workers left their children with husbands or other
relatives and some had older children who took care of
the younger. Few of the mothers employed help or patronized the day nursery These data indicate a very real problem in view of the increasing number of housewives who
are taking war jobs in industries."
On October 1, 1943, the Office of War Information released a
report in which it discussed the recent increase in juvenile delinquency. Considering the effect of the war upon juvenile delinquency this report-states
"The connection between war and delinquency is not spelled
out in court statistics because juveniles are brought into
court for the same specific offenses (stealing, sex offenses,
acts of mischief) that they were before the war.
"The connection, however, is there. Father has gone to war;
mother has gone to work. Homes are crowded. There is no
place for the yongsters to play, no place for the older girls
to entertain. The living room is a bedroom, youngsters are
pushed into the street. may end up in a cheap hotel.
"It is true that many of these factors were present in peace
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time. But investigation reveals that war has accentuated
old problems, woven them into a complex pattern for which
there is no neat solution.
"There is evidence that the present employment of a large
number of. women in war industries is. resulting in lack of
supervision of younger children and lack of sympathy with
older children.
"Officials who are giving attention to this problem point out
that a democracy cannot put up barriers at the factory gate,
forbidding women with small children to take employment,
nor can it prohibit employers from hiring women with
small children.
"The \Var Manpower Commission has issued a policy statement stressing the fact that the first responsibility of women
with .children is to give suitable care in their own homes to
their children, and that in order that family life may not be
unnecessarily disrupted,, special effort to secure the employment in industry of women with young children should
be deferred until full use has been made of all other sources
of labor supply It is further stated that when women with
young children are employed, adequate facilities should be
provided for the day care of those children."
However true it is that governmentally we cannot forbid women
with small children to take employment or prohibit employers
from hiring women with small children, nevertheless current unemployment compensation decisions point out that governmentally
we are putting economic pressure on women with young children
who want work to take employment at the most undesirable hours.
'We seldom find unemployment compensation tribunals adopting
the approach taken by the Georgia Board of Review
"When an employer establishes a business and employs a great
number of women to work in that business, the employer
necessarily knows that a great many of those women, if
then unmarried, will in due course of time, become married,
and that in all probability there will be children, and those
women employees will owe a duty to those children which
will, for the benefit of society as a whole, outweigh any
and all consideration of duty that the employee might owe
to the employer It should also be remembered that employers have employed women generally in industrial and coimercial types of .work because they could get a greater
amount of work out of the women for the money paid
than they could get out of men. That being true. if occasionally an employer fails to get a reduction in the contributions to the Bureau on his payroll tax because some woman
-the mother of children-has been paid benefits while off
duty taking her chance of collecting the benefits or going
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hungry rather than leave the children alone at night, that
employer has no real, just cause for complaint.
"This is the age-old question as to the importance of the

individual as compared with and to the dollar. Our social
legislation recognizes that when it comes to weighing or
balancing dollars against human beings, the human being
should outweigh the dollar, otherwise- there would have
been no social legislation.
"Keeping these things in mind, it occurs to the writer of
this decision that the mother of children, who is able to
work, willing to work, and available for work during the
daytime, should not be disqualified from receiving benefits
merely because she considers the welfare of her children
of paramount importance aid elects to spend the night with
them rather than in the mill, when she cannot secure the
services of someone else to be with the children at .night."1 1

POSSIBLE

RULES

The Superior Court of Barrow County, Georgia, attempted in
Camwood Mfg. Co. v. Hinet.2 to give an exact meaning to the
word "available" as it is used in the Georgia statute. The court
said in part:
"The infinite variety of fact and circumstances which may
present the question in the course of human experience
would be difficult if not impossible to cover by exact language in one definition."
C
Just as it is difficult to isolate the factors which comprise availability, so it is difficult to determie wIch of these factqrs may be
modified or withdrawn (and this is essentially the problem of
limited availability) and still leave substantial availability.11 Ve
are, therefore, presenting possible rules for determining the availability issue in cases which involve shift employment. Some of
these rules have been enunciated by courts and administrative
tribunals, others represent possible views which have not been so
enunciated.
1. ALL

SUITABLE WORK

ox

ALL SHIFTS

The Connecticut Court in the Dinovellis Case held that a
aclimant in order to be available for work must be willing to
31U. C. I. S., 8254-Ga. R., Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 12.
32G. C. I. S., 8417-Ga. Ct. D., Ben. Ser., Vol. 7, No. 3.
33
"Substantial availability" is not intended as a substitute concept for
-"availability" or "total availability." We use the phrase to denote a difference betveen a literal and a reasonable compliance with the statutory requirement.
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accept any suitable work, all hours, any shift. The South Carolina
court in the second Judson Mills Case was even more specific.

The claimant not only must be available for any stutable work,
he must definitely be available for the work which he had been
doing on the same shift that he had worked previously
It would be possible, of course, to limit the statement of the
rule more than the above-mentioned cases have done. The rule
with the "good cause" linutation could be so stated In order
to be available for work a claimant must be available for any
suitable work which he has no "good cause" for refusing. The
lack of available suitable work for a claimant or the good cause
he may have for refusing otherwise suitable work will not, however make available for work a claimant who in fact is detached
from the labor force.
2. Two OUT

OF THREE SIuFTS

In accordance with the holding in the first Judson Mills Case,
a claimant must be able and available for a majority of the average
number of hours customarily worked each (lay in the industry
Thus. in an industry which worked three shifts a clay, a claimant
in order to be available for work would have to be available for
work on two of the three shifts. If work on two of the three shifts
were unsuitable for the claimant, it appears that the claimant
should be required to3be available only for the shift which is suitable in order that the requirement be consonant with the rule that
a worker need be available only for suitable work.
It further appears that the rule could be stated in terms which
would require the worker to be available tor two out of three
shifts, except that he could limit himself to work on one shift in
the event that he would have good cause for refusing work on any
4

other shift.1

3. ONE

SHIFT

\nother possible rule with respect to what hours a claimant
must be willing to work in order to meet the eligibility requrements is that a claimant must be available for only one shift. It
would appear that the validity of such a rule and indeed of any
other would depend on the particular conditions in the community \pparently this rule would take full account of any claimant s circumstances by allowing him to select the shift on which
•4See

discussion under 1.
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he would be willing to work. There presumably would be a decided bias in favor of day shifts. Since, in many instances, due
to union contracts, seniority provisions, etc., work might very
well not be available to the claimant on the shift specified by him,
it might be said that the claimant was not really available for work.
In such an instance, however, it is believed that the claimant's
availability should not be reckoned in terms of whether or not
there was work available to him but solely on the basis of whether
or not he was available for work. Thus, in a case" in which the
claimant, mother of a small child, was available for day work only,
which the employer was unable to give her, the Delaware Unemployment Compensation Commission held that she was available
for work. The Commission said in part:
"Turning now to the instant case, we see a woman, a good
worker who is unable to work on the night shift because
she Ean find no one to care for her child. She is available
for work during the day. Despite ever-increasing night
work due to defense industry, the daytime is unquestionably the normal period of work in this community. We have
no hesitation, therefore, in holding that claimant is available for work. We are the happier to arrive at this decision
because a contrary finding would, in our opinion, render
a real disservice to the social welfare of the many children
of working parents in this city"
4.

No GENERAL RULE

FACTS OF EACH CASE CONTROLLING

It would be possible and we believe desirable to lay down no
rule as to the hours which a claimant must be willing to work in
order to be available for work. Thus, on a case by case basis, the
deciding tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, would cons;der all the relevant facts in each case and decide accordingly.
Domestic circumstances, social welfare, economic factors, working
conditions in the community, etc., should all be weighed before
arriving at a decision. Since the number of possible variants of
these factors is tremendous, only on a case by case basis can
equitable and accurate results be had in each instance.
SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES

Since even decision on a case by case basis requires some
controlling principles, we would suggest the following broad
propositions as guides. Although they are general and applicable
35U. C. I. S., 7778-Del. R, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6. No. 2.

MINNESOTA LAV REVIEW

to the entire limited availability field, they should be helpful in
shift employment cases.
A. (1) There is a proper distinction between limitations upon
employability which are voluntarily imposed (e.g. the claimant
who won't accept night work simply because he "just doesn't like
it") and those which are involuntarily incurred (e.g. the claimant
whose sight deficiencies prohibit him from working nights) This
distinction has a particular bearing in borderline cases of limited
availability In such cases, all other things being equal, more evidence is required as to the availability of a claimant who voluntarily limits his employability than is required in the case of a
claimant who has involuntarily incurred such a liilitation.o
(2) The bases of this distinction are (a) the fundamental
purpose of the unemployment compensation laws is the compensation ot involuntary employment, (b) the essence of a claimant's
availability is his willingness to work.
This does not mean that to be available for work a worker
must abstain from voluntarily inposing any limitations upon his
employability Under certain conditions, a worker may, without
destroying his availability, impose various limitations upon his
employability with no better reason than his personal preference.
What it does signify is this. If the limitation existing upon the
worker's employability leaves no doubt that he is nevertheless
attached to the active labor force and a candidate for work, the
reason for the limitation makes no difference. If, on the other
hand. it is clear that the limitation upon the worker's emplovability removes him from the active labor force, then the reason
for the limitation will again have no effect upon the determination.
In those cases, however, where doubt exists as to whether or not
the limitation will serve to remove the worker from the active
labor force, we may and properly should look to the reason for
the limitation. In such instances, limitations which are voluntarily
imlposed will more readily result in a ruling that the claimant is
unavailable for work than if they are involuntarily incurred.
In any application of the foregoing proposition, it is essential
to remember that a limitation may change in character from one
36

The term "voluntary" is used in this statement in a broader sense than
"done with one's consent" or "intentional." As used here, it refers to "freedom of choice, self-impelled, unconstrained by interference." The woman
who refuses to accept night work because she can find no one to care for
her baby. the family man who refuses to accept work which would require
him to move to a town where there was wholly inadequate housing-such
workers do not voluntarily limit their employability.
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involuntarily incurred to one that is actually voluntary The onecompany town wlich has been abandoned by the "company"
furnishes a good. illustration. A worker who is left there may be
said at the outset to be suffering an involuntary limitation upon
Ins availability. If he remains there, and insists upon staying, this
limitation eventually becomes voluntary. This "bridge" concept
of limited availability is closely related to the idea that unemployment compensation was designed to furnish a "bridge of benefits"
between two periods of employmeit for workers.
B. Availability for work requires no more than availability for
suitable work. It might reasonably be said, if qualified as we have
suggested in Rule 1 above, that it requires no more than availability for suitable work which the claimant has no good cause for
refusing.
C. The work for which a claimant must be available can be
determined only in relation to that particular claimant. It is individualized. This is a cor6llary of (B) above. The suitability of
work cannot be determined abstractly, it has often been said, without consideration of its appropriateness for a particular individual.
This result is required by the statutes which specify fliat certain
criteria must be appliedon determining the suitability of work
"for an individual."
D. The thesis that availability for work means attachment to
the active labor force furnishes us with certain other fundamental
propositions. The active labor force consists of the workers who
are employed and the unemployed workers who are active candidates for jobs. Unemployment compensation naturally is particularly concerned with the latter group. These workers have
services to sell to employers. When they are unemployed, they
are in the same position as merchants seeking buyers for their
goods. The- merchant is not required to sell or offer for sale all
the goods he is equipped to handle or even, all the goods lie has in
stock in order to retain his position ii the market. All lie has to do
is be prepared to sell a significant amount of merchandise for
which there is ordinarily a demand. Furthermore, the position of
the merchant depends wholly upon the amount of economic activity
existing in the business in which he wishes to engage. That economic activity must be gauged in terms of the "locality" the merchant is to serve. Thus, the. would-be liquor store owner who
seeks to do business in a "dry" county is certainly out of business.
This same reasoning should apply to the unemployed members
of the active labor force. They are merchants of services, selling
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their labor to employers. As such, whether or not they are in
business depends to a considerable extent upon the industrial
practices in their communities. This approach leads us to the
following
(1) Availability for work does not require availability for all
suitable work. All it requires is availability for a substantial amount of suitable work.
(2) The determination of what is a substantial amount of
suitable work depends largely upon the industrial practices in the labor market area in which the claimant is
willing and able to work.
(3) Availability for work does not require that a claimant be
available for his customary or most recent work. If lie
satisfies the condition expressed in (1) above. i.e., if he
is available for a substantial amount of suitable work. lie
has (lone all that is required of him.
E. \Ve would suggest this "rule" as to the effect of limitations
on employability No limitation upon employability should be
deemed to render a claimant unavailable for work unless the
limitation is such as to show that the claimant is either unwilling
or unable to accept a substantial amount of stuitable work or unless
it is such as to show that he is not substantially usable in
the labor market which is available to him.
More important than any "proposition" or "rule" we could
formulate is a clear understanding that unemployment compensation is a social program. It would appear highly desirable that
wherever possible the results of this program should be entirelh
consistent with the broad social aims of the nation. Such consistency can never be attained if legalism, allowed to run rampant
in behalf of employer interests. is permitted to distort a benefit
paying program into a "fund-protecting," tax-reducing system.

